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1. Introduction 
 
The volatility of global oil prices in the past decade is widely reported, yet the 
disparate consumption pattern between developing and developed countries is scarcely 
analysed. Oil prices charts have looked like a rollercoaster ride throughout the last thirty 
years. The introduction of netback pricing temporarily saw the brakes applied and instability 
slowed. However, this could not be sustained in the face of rapid economic growth from 
emerging economies. The fundamental change in living standards experienced in these 
countries has seen increased oil usage. The developing countries are climbing the ‘energy 
ladder’, moving to industrial enterprise. 
 Global energy consumption is valued at around $3.65 trillion annually, making up 
approximately 5 percent of global GDP (BP, 2014; World Bank, 2014). The oil market it a 
significant portion of the global economy thus the shocks to this market can cause significant 
macroeconomic turbulence. Currently, the distribution of oil consumption is changing. 
Demand in China is expected to surpass the US in 2029 and non-OECD Asian demand is 
expected to grow by six million-barrels per day through to 2030 (BP, 2013). In contrast to 
OECD countries, demand fell between 2006-08 with the price increases suspected to have 
played a role (Wurzel et al., 2009).  
 More than one-third of energy use comes from oil, more than any other source of fuel 
(Rubin, 2012). Oil’s role as a transit fuel is of paramount importance in the daily lives of most 
citizens worldwide. The price of oil is a significant driver of economic development and is so 
inextricably a part of modern society that an oil shock can have a significant impact on an 
economy. Rubin (2012, p. 33) states an oil shock can “deep-six” an economy, as other 
consumption suffers as the effect of high oil prices is transmitted to the wider economy. 
Oil price shocks have previously been considered to be caused primarily by supply 
disruption. Historical shocks are strongly correlated with major geopolitical disturbances 
(Hamilton, 2003). In the recent episode no one major war or instability can be attributed to the 
shock. In fact supply remained constant (BP, 2014). The fundamental cause suggested was a 
shock to demand. Hamilton (2009) postulated the cause was a classic economic shortage 
situation. The increased global demand would have required significant supply increases to 
sustain the pre-shock price level. This was not experienced. Moreover, non-OPEC countries 
reduced oil supply as we will discover later in this paper. The primary economic problem was 
an issue of scarcity occurring from a demand shock.  
An emerging hypothesis is that the elasticities for income and price vary between 
developed and developing countries. Consideration of elasticities is taken by previous papers 
e.g. Gately and Huntington (2002); Hamilton (1983). Despite the simplicity of the technique 
the expanse of comparable studies for different time periods enables cross-study comparison. 
This study uses two separate cross-country panels which enables the comparison of 
consumption patterns between country groups of varied development (see Appendix 1). This 
paper will also use decomposition of the price and income series to account for asymmetric 
effect of these on consumption. The period of analysis is 1980-2012, as this provides a wide 
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coverage of oil price instability and considers a more up to date panel than has previously 
been published.  
This paper analyses the varying oil consumption patterns of developed and developing 
countries during the period of an oil price shock. The use of asymmetric price and income 
decomposition will allow a greater understanding of the impact of not only the price shock 
but also the global financial crisis. In developing countries demand is expected to be fuelled 
by economic expansion (income effect), whereas, in developed economies, the substitution 
effect plays a larger role. Price elasticity of demand for oil should vary between the two 
panels.  
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature surrounding the oil 
market and the development in estimation techniques. Section 3 considers the driving forces 
of an oil price shock and analyses their significance in the 2007-08 price shock. Section 4 sets 
out the methodology which underpins the analysis undertaken. Section 5 presents and 
interprets the results and establishes policy implications. Section 6 provides a summative 
conclusion.  
 
 
2. Previous Studies of Oil Price and Consumption 
 
The literature surrounding the economics of the oil market has evolved considerably 
since the 1970’s. Studies initially sought to establish how oil consumption and other 
macroeconomic indicators were interrelated. Since the late 1980’s, the use of asymmetric 
decomposition has been applied however there is varied support for its relevance. Newer 
studies have focused more on the developing economies and their growing energy demands. 
A cross-country panel data analysis can aid understanding of global consumption patterns. 
However, due to the proximity of the recent oil shock there is a scarcity of literature 
investigating its economic impact. 
Hamilton (1983) in his seminal work discussed the relationship with oil consumption 
and the wider economy. The paper highlights the evidence that all US recessions are preceded 
by an oil shock, where typically an increase in oil prices is followed 3-4 quarters later with a 
shock to domestic output. The study illustrated one of the first explicit relationships between 
oil and the lagged transmission to the economy. Hamilton undertakes causality testing to 
establish that the oil price was a key factor in the signalling of recession.  
Numerous studies following Hamilton (1983) have found a relationship between oil 
consumption and variables such as income, inflation, and exchange rates. The effect of a price 
shock is estimated by Burbidge and Harrison (1984). They find that during the period 1962-
1981 in Canada, Japan, West Germany, USA and UK a shock of one-deviation to oil price 
leads to a rise in wages and inflation. They also found a significant decline in industrial 
production (a proxy for growth) following the shock in the US and UK though the effect is 
less significant in other countries. 
Despite these findings the macroeconomic relationship has been questioned. Mork 
(1989) noted that in the period used in Hamilton’s work all price movements were positive 
and questioned if the relationship would hold in periods of price decline. Through developing 
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separate variables for price increases/decreases Mork mirrors the results of Hamilton (1983) 
during price increases but for prices decline the result is statistically insignificant. 
Consequently, only positive price changes appear to transmit to the US economy. One must 
consider if such results would also hold for developing economies.  
The asymmetry of oil prices was investigated using a Koyck (1954) lag-demand 
function with an additional price and/or income decomposition term in Gately and Huntington 
(2002). Results for OECD countries echo the findings of Mork (1989) - that price increases 
have greater effect on demand for oil than price decreases. Therefore failure to account for 
price asymmetry may bias estimations of demand. OECD countries experience an income 
response, which is “dramatically different from its effect in the developing countries” (Gately 
and Huntington, 2002, p. 16).  
Indeed, the global effect may be negligible but that is a net effect. Comparison of 
developing versus developed economies yields different results. Rubin (2012) considers in the 
present scenario where oil demand is outstripping supply to be a ‘zero-sum’ situation. The 
analysis shows that emerging economies are price insensitive to oil in comparison to the 
industrialised economies. In part this is attributable to China and India experiencing large 
increases in income. This is due to what he describes as a “transformational development in 
the way life is lived” (Rubin, 2012, p. 142). It is argued that as the living standards change the 
income elasticity will be nearing unity. 
There was a considerable gap in the literature surrounding the economic impact of oil 
price shocks in developing countries. Tang et al. (2010) consider the Chinese economy, and 
observed that a rise in oil price leads to an increase in inflation and interest, but a negative 
effect on output and investment. The authors highlight the price controls and that they prevent 
the market from operating. Nonetheless, China reacts to price shocks, however this is 
significantly dampened as a result of price controls. They show that price elasticity of demand 
for energy is very low in the short-term, but does note that in the longer term the consumption 
of energy is more sensitive to higher prices. 
A number of studies have calculated demand elasticities. Cooper (2003) estimates the 
price elasticity of demand for 23 countries in the period 1971-2000 and established the 
demand for oil to be price-inelastic in the short term and ranging from -0.016 (Finland) to -
0.109 (Iceland). In the long run countries experience greater responsiveness to price. Cooper 
does not consider asymmetric decomposition. Dargay (1992) looked at the UK elasticities 
between 1960-1990. Price elasticities were found to react significantly to the 1979-81 oil 
price rise, with a short-run elasticity of -0.5 deviating from a mean elasticity of -0.1. 
Nonetheless, the period saw great increases in energy efficiency. The study notes there would 
need to be a large price rise to incite such changes in energy demand. One could consider if 
this has been the case in the recent price shock.  
 A study by the IMF demonstrated the economic transmission of an unexpected $5 
increase in oil prices. The study applies the global economic model MULTIMOD to establish 
the effects. It discovered that the price shock would cause a 0.3 per cent decline in global 
output in the two years after the event and the effect would be 0.4 per cent in the developed 
economies of the USA and European Union (IMF, 2001). This indicates a difference in 
developed economies response which could be attributed to greater reliance on energy 
intensive technology and a slower rate of adjustment.  
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According to Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) China has experienced energy efficiency 
gains since its economic liberalisation in the 1970’s. The scope for efficiency gains is present 
in a developing nation, as manufacturing processes have not yet reached maturity. They report 
a gain of 30 per cent in efficiency of oil products, and to an extent attribute this to rising 
energy costs. Hang and Tu (2007) validate the results through elasticities, noting pre-1995 oil 
price elasticity was -0.544 and post-1995 at -0.059; confirming the declining ability to adjust 
for prices as the ability for further energy efficiency gains approaches a minima. The makeup 
of the Chinese economy as a newly industrialising nation could have caused a disparity from 
industrialised economies and consequently may react uniquely to an oil price shock.  
Hamilton (2009) considers the recent oil price shock in the United States. The paper 
provided a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the recent price shock. It 
argued that demand was the main driving factor in the recent episode, yet this was multiplied 
due to speculative activity. It is estimated that the increase in oil prices caused real US GDP 
growth to be 0.7 per cent lower than expected during 2007Q4 - 2008Q3. A main cause of 
price rise is attributed to increased demand from developing countries, yet Hamilton does not 
analyse these nations. 
Aastveit et al. (2012) considers the effect of the price shock on a global scale. They 
find that different geographical regions have varying responses to oil shocks, with the 
developed economies suffering greater negative shocks. They report that European and US 
economic activity is permanently reduced by an oil shock but in emerging economies activity 
falls to a lesser degree and in some cases a temporary increase in activity is experienced 
following a supply shock. Yet, the approach is time-series and not a cross-country pooled 
approach, hence a shortcoming in the literature exists. 
 
 
3. Determination of Oil Price 
3.1 Recent Price Volatility 
Energy price shocks are determined by a number of factors which synthesise in a 
complex transmissions channel. Oil prices during the period of study have seen great 
volatility, entering into what could be regarded as the third epoch of crude oil pricing (Dvir 
and Rogoff, 2010). Figure 1 illustrates the clear structural breaks in oil pricing since 1861. 
Epoch I is characterised by price instability as the new discovery of oil is commercialised and 
unsteady supply is prevalent. Epoch II is the era of ‘cheap’ energy, steady prices, and the 
formalisation of the oil market occurred which resulted in a stable pricing policy. It is Epoch 
III, which is of great interest. During this period the market experienced high levels of 
volatility. The 1980 price shock was followed by what appeared to be a return to be stability, 
but this was soon upturned by the price shock in the 2000’s.  
Volatility in the price of oil has been evident in Epoch III. There is a significant peak 
in 1986 following a reversal of the oil industry shock at the turn of the 1980’s. The 
introduction of formula netback pricing took place in 1986 which links the production sale 
price to a crude oil benchmark price (Downey, 2009). The introduction of price benchmarking 
could be seen to have remedied the issue of mispricing. 
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Figure 1: Historical Prices 1861-2012 separated into three epochs. 
Data Source: BP (2014) 
 
The recent price shock is of particular interest to this study. The real price of oil in 
2008 was the highest since 1864. There have been a number of explanations for the cause of 
this rapid surge in prices; the main theories are focused around disequilibrium in supply and 
demand (Cantore et al., 2012). Emerging economies are increasing their demand for oil; at the 
same time advanced industrialised economies are reducing consumption (Rubin, 2012). 
Nonetheless, global oil consumption is increasing year-on-year (BP, 2013). The recent shock 
is primarily characterised by a rapid increase in demand as opposed to a supply shock. This is 
in stark contrast to previous oil shocks (Hamilton, 2009). The reminder of this chapter will 
consider the factors using the framework of Cantore et al., (2012) and apply them to the 2008 
price shock to establish the key driving factors. 
 
3.2 Supply 
 
The global supply of oil is deemed not to provide a limiting factor in meeting 
projected demand till 2035 (IEA, 2012). According to the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy in the past decade global proved reserves have increased by 26 per cent; and the R/P 
ratio
1
 has increased to 52.9 years from 48.3 years (BP, 2014).  
 The increase in global proven reserves has arisen in 70 percent of cases from revisions 
to estimations of already discovered fields. As technology improves a high recoverable rate is 
                                                 
1
 R/P ratio is the “reserves-to-production” ratio and represents the length of time production could 
continue based on the current reserves and production rate. 
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achievable (IEA, 2012). New fields are no longer solely conventional oil wells. Technological 
advances and the higher energy prices have lead to development of tar sands, tight oil 
extraction, and deep-water drilling operations (Rubin, 2012). Interest in offshore oil in the 
Artic has been described as the “final frontier” (IEA, 2012, p. 110); the level of production is 
low and the technical and environmental risks are recognised. As conventional routes of 
supply change, the oil majors must adapt to supply the ever-present market demand.  
 As previously conjectured, the recent oil shock is assumed to have occurred due to 
disequilibrium in the market fundamentals. Researchers have suggested the fundamental 
cause of the price shock was not due to a specific supply shock as witnessed in previous oil 
price shocks (Hamilton, 2009). Consideration of the level of output by OPEC and non-OPEC 
countries respectively highlights a stalling of oil production during the period 2004-2008 in 
comparison to the forecast. Kaufmann (2011) hypothesises that the halt to production in non-
OPEC countries caused a reduction in OPEC spare capacity. Production hiatus from the non-
OPEC producers was not expected as Kaufmann (2011) reports the US Energy Information 
Administration expected that non-OPEC supply would increase by approximately 9 million 
barrels daily (EIA, 2005). A slowdown in oil supply would lead to a situation of shortage and 
a rise in prices. 
During the oil price shock a number of global events could have influenced the supply 
of oil causing negative supply shocks. Table 1 outlines major events, which contributed to 
supply disruption. The potential of conflict over Iranian nuclear programme in 2007-08 could 
have influenced the price of oil significantly; it was estimated that the effect of intervention 
would have caused prices to increase by one-third (te Velde, 2007). Despite deviations in 
supply this has merely caused temporary shocks to the production schedule which has had 
limited supply side effect. The principal trend has not been one of supply reduction but rather 
a failure to increase production (Hamilton, 2009).  
 
Table 1: Geopolitical disturbances and their impact on supply 
Source: Hamilton (2009, 2011) and BP (2014) 
Date Event Impact on Supply 
2001-onwards 
 
2003 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006-08 
War on Terror 
 
 
Venezuela Unrest 
 
Gulf of Mexico Hurricanes 
 
 
Nigerian Conflict 
Iraq war cut 2.2 MBD during April-July 2003 
 
General strike cut supply for two months by 2.1 
MBD on previous year 
 
Reduction of 0.064 MBD on previous year 
Damage to offshore oil platforms  
 
Cut of 0.5 MBD during turmoil  
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Saudi Arabia has an influential position as the world’s largest crude oil reserves (BP, 
2014). Saudi exports oil to a diverse and varied consumer base including Europe, US and the 
Far East. The Kingdom maintains a large reserve of crude oil, which has compensated global 
supply in times of supply interruptions (Huntington et al., 2012). Yet, the Saudi production 
was 850,000 barrels a day lower in 2007 than in 2005 (Hamilton, 2009). 
In addition to stagnation of crude oil production a shortage of refinery capacity 
emerged in the early 2000’s. This was following a long period of surplus in refinery capacity 
since the 1970’s, which maintained low refining margins. At the turn of the millennium, 
refinery shortage was an issue, which increased refinery margins during the time of already 
rising prices (Downey, 2009). Refinery capacity was soon increased following a number of 
construction projects, and once again spare capacity is realised so that supply shocks can be 
softened. However, as Downey (2009) points out, while capacity in refining may no longer be 
an issue, extracting the crude may be a different problem.  
 In the lead up and during the recent oil price shock, there was no significant long-term 
decline in production of oil, rather a slowing of growth in production. The transient deviations 
in oil supply as a consequence of geopolitics may have caused short-term market deviations 
in price. Nonetheless, production inertia was the primary trend in oil supply and this is 
significantly different to any previous oil price shock. 
 
3.3 Demand 
 
Since the 1980’s global oil consumption has increased at a staggering rate. There has 
been a doubling in oil demand from non-OECD countries since 1980, representing an 
additional 24 million barrels of oil a day (BP, 2014). The compounding growth of non-OECD 
demand is shown in Figure 2. Projections by Petrie (2011) estimate an additional 1.4 million 
barrels per day on average will be demanded until 2015. However, one must note over the 
same time basis OECD countries are seen to be reducing oil demand. This is especially 
evident between 2005 and 2009 and indicated potential differences in elasticity between the 
two country groups. 
The growth of oil demand particularly in the Chinese market has been postulated to be 
one of the main causes of the rapid rise in oil prices during the 2000’s (Hamilton, 2009; 
Kilian, 2009). The growth in Chinese oil demand has looked not short of exponential in the 
past-two decades. China accounts for 30 percent of the increased global consumption since 
1980 (BP, 2013). One of the main constituents of their increased demand requirements is that 
of growing domestic consumption, with citizens now having disposable income (Rubin, 
2012). Consequently, there have been large increases in personal transport, sales of cars and 
light commercial vehicle now exceed 20 million cars per year (Petrie, 2011). The increased 
use of oil in transport fuels for China is a very significant change to the global oil market, and 
significantly adjusts the worldwide distribution of oil.  
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Figure 2: Annual change in oil consumption OECD vs. non-OECD countries. 
Data Source: BP (2014) 
 
Decomposition of the recent oil price shock reinforces the importance of demand from 
developing countries. It is estimated that the emerging markets added 55 dollars in real terms 
to the peak price of oil in 2008 (Aastveit et al., 2012). Additionally, without reduced demand 
from developed countries the price would have risen even higher. Countries have 
heterogeneous tolerance to oil prices and are able to tolerate oil price rises to a certain point, 
after which they will adjust consumption patterns. Table 2 shows the estimates of this price. 
Despite the reliance on oil in the short term as experienced by developing countries, it is the 
EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa) which is able to tolerate the highest prices. 
Therefore, the reductions in demand from developed countries over the price shock could be 
due to other factors such as energy efficiency or substitution to other forms of energy.  
 
Table 2: Peak tolerable oil price. 
Source: Petrie (2011) 
Location Peak Price (Barrel USD) 
US 
Eurozone 
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Latin America 
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Population is expected to grow by one billion in the next decade and Petrie (2011) 
argues population will be a definite driver of oil demand. Currently, 20 per cent of the world’s 
population account for 50 per cent of global energy demand. If the remaining 80 per cent 
increased their energy demand per capita to the same level there would only be twenty-five 
years of reserves (Wagner, 2008).. Economic growth is assumed to have a linear relationship 
with per capita oil demand ceteris paribus (Huntington et al., 2012). The industrialisation of 
non-OECD economies has increased their domestic energy requirements, as industrial 
expansion is needed to sustain growth and based on estimates demand will increase at least as 
fast as GDP (Medlock and Soligo, 2001). Galli (1998) observes a correlation between energy 
use and economic growth in non-OECD countries, but the converse is observed in OECD 
countries. This non-monotonic relationship can be approximated with a squared-income term. 
However, recent studies have estimated that the linear relationship for developing countries 
still holds. This is explained due to increasing energy intensity during economic development 
(Benthem and Romani, 2009). 
Growing oil demand may have been caused by unexpected high rates of GDP growth 
in non-OECD countries mainly in Asian economies, but also notably high growth in some 
OECD members, especially Japan. The growth rates of economies were inadequately forecast 
and are biased downwards. Therefore, the Chinese GDP growth was on average 0.12 per cent 
above a priori expectations each month, which is argued to have compounded over time and 
prompted large adjustments in global oil demand (Kilian and Hicks, 2009). As the growth rate 
was unexpected, there would be insufficient supply to meet the demand something which was 
experienced in the recent shock. Thus, in a situation of economic shortage of a commodity, 
theory suggests prices rises will be encountered (Barksy and Kilian, 2002).  
 The recent price shock is often regarded to have occurred as a result of a demand 
shock. Indeed, development in non-OECD countries has been extensive and this is expected 
to have contributed to increased oil consumption. Yet, one must consider if different countries 
have different experiences to the recent price shock. If the work of Kilian and Hicks (2009) is 
considered to hold, unexpected growth in demand would have been a major contributing 
factor in explaining the recent price shock.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Methodological Advancements 
 
Energy consumption models came to the forefront following the oil crisis of the 
1970’s. A key study was that of Pindyck (1979), the paper analysed global energy demand 
and estimated demand models for different oil products. Pindyck recognises the issue of data 
availability and reliability in developing countries. Consequently a simple log-linear model 
for price and income incorporating a lag term to account for the dynamic adjustment is 
employed. The use of a lagged term overcomes the potential model breakdown in periods of 
unstable energy prices (Westoby and Pearce, 1984). The model postulated by Pindyck (1979) 
has been used in many estimations of income and price elasticity of oil (e.g., Dargary (1992); 
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Gately and Huntington (2002); Cooper (2003)). Pindyck found that developing counties have 
high income-elasticity but low price-elasticity, thus economic growth fuels demand for energy 
and predicts that higher prices would impede growth prospects. This early paper recognises 
that energy usage is strongly correlated to the economic growth rate. 
The development of econometric analysis enabled the application of pooled models 
and provided a better understanding of demand patterns as the use of a pooled data model can 
substantially increase the efficiency of an econometric model. Adelman (1984, p. 5) suggests 
that the global oil market is “one great pool.” Baltagi and Griffin (1997) pooled data for 
gasoline demand for 18 OECD countries and establish that pooling data sets increases the 
model efficiency especially over a longer period. However, as their data is across a set of 
comparable countries, OECD nations, one must consider if the pooled data model would work 
across a more global data set.  
 Fawcett and Price (2012) use a global pooled model with a more heterogeneous group 
of countries during the period 1984-2009 to provide a robust estimation. In order to establish 
the differences in groups of countries, they run cross-country panel data models for G7, 
remaining OECD, developing Asia and Latin America. Estimation of different panels can 
reduce the cross sectional heterogeneity which arise from pooling dissimilar economies 
following Pesaran et al. (1995). This study does not undertake asymmetry decomposition and 
therefore the effect of the shock is not established.  
Despite the amass of research to date, there has been little research which considers 
specifically what effect the 2007-08 oil shock had on countries with varied levels of 
development. Research that encompasses the period of the price shock is limited as it only 
considers a time-series model for example Aastveit et al. (2012). The literature has not yet 
considered an asymmetric decomposition during the recent period of unstable pricing. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Model 
 
Considering previous research the most efficient modelling technique is to follow the 
conceptual ideas of Gately and Huntington (2002), van Benthem and Romani (2009), and 
Fawcett and Price (2012). Not only does the small number of variables increase the likelihood 
of data availability in developing countries, it also allows the results of study to be compared 
to previous research. Therefore, it is assumed oil demand can be represented as: 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
Table 3 highlights the variables to be used and provides a summary of the symbols 
which will be employed in this paper. The dependent variable of per-capita oil demand is 
employed to account for the natural requirement of energy due to the size of the population. 
As noted previously, population growth is one of the key drivers of oil demand (Petrie, 2011). 
Consequently, a considerable number of studies model per-capita oil demand (Pindyck, 1979; 
Cooper, 2003; Fawcett and Price, 2012). Modelling demand as the dependent variable in 
logarithmic form provides elasticities of demand.  
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Table 3: Variables and symbols used 
Variable Symbol Description Data Source 
Demand 
 
 
Income 
 
 
Price 
 
 
Country 
 
Random Error 
Di,t 
 
 
Yi,t  
 
 
Pt 
 
 
𝜃𝑖  
 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Natural logarithm of per-capita oil demand, in 
country i in year t 
 
Natural logarithm of GDP per-capita (current 
US$), in country i in year t 
 
Natural logarithm of the real price of a barrel 
of oil 
 
Country fixed effect variable 
 
Random stochastic error term 
 BP (2014) 
 
 
World Bank (2014) 
 
 
BP (2014) 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 We consider the effect of oil demand during a period of price shock. Accordingly, a 
measure of oil price is included in the models. BP produced a table of crude oil prices at 2012 
prices based upon the most commonly traded spot price during that period. As such, across 
this study 1980-1983 uses Arabian Light prices and from 1984-2012 Brent spot prices are 
employed. The panel assumes the price of oil to be exogenous to each country. Therefore no 
individual country ‘pump’ oil prices is considered which helps avoid the problem of 
endogeneity. Fawcett and Price (2012) utilise this assumption to combat the downward biased 
price elasticities as suggested by Kilian and Murphy (2010). Oil prices are expected to have a 
negative relationship with demand, consistent with demand theory. 
The income variable is measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and 
provides a cross-country comparison of relative wealth. Data is obtained from the World 
Bank and the variable is calculated as current US dollar prices to account for inflationary 
differences. In a review of oil price elasticity studies, it is found most major studies have 
employed an income term using GDP or GNP per capita (Hoffman, 2012).  
 
4.3 Model Specification 
 
As specification can significantly adjust the parameters obtained (Dahl, 1993), a 
number of forms will be estimated.  
4.3.1 Static Linear Model 
A panel data model approach based on the work of Gately and Huntington (2002) is 
employed in this study. Initially, the relationship is to be estimated as: 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
The simple nature of this specification enables the elasticities of income and price to 
be estimated with ease as: 
 𝜖𝑌 = 𝛼1  and 𝜖𝑃 = 𝛼2 (3) 
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Income elasticity estimates the responsiveness of oil demand to economic growth rate. 
Price elasticity is expected to be negative. As the price of the commodity rises, demand theory 
suggests consumption will fall. Developed countries are more likely to be sensitive to prices 
than developing countries as they are more mature in their energy profile. 
4.3.2 Dynamic Linear Model 
The addition of a lagged dependent variable for one period allows for estimation of 
long-term price elasticity as it considers the speed of adjustment to price and income changes. 
The addition of a lagged term gives a dynamic model that can “provide robust forecasts” 
(Bhattacharyya and Timilsina, 2009, p. 44). As Gujarati (2003) notes dynamic models can 
account for psychological, technological and institutional factors. The oil market is subject to 
effects of the same factors. Psychological effects occur due to inertia in demand. Technology 
needs time to adapt to price changes due to the widespread use of oil. Institutional obligations 
in the form of futures contracts influence future demand. Gujarati (2003) states that short-run 
elasticities will therefore be significantly lower than the long-run counterparts. The addition 
of a Koyck-lag to the demand term as a lagged dependent variable specifies the elasticities to 
represent the short term (Koyck, 1954). The dynamic model is: 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 
The addition of the lag to equation (2) enables more flexibility as it accounts for 
adjustments occurring overtime. The lagged term does however assume that the adjustment 
speed for both price and income is equal. In order to estimate the long run elasticity for 
equation (4), we divide the short-term elasticities by 1 − 𝛾 (van Benthem and Romani, 2009).  
4.3.3 Asymmetric Decomposition 
Some studies highlight the need to consider asymmetric response or imperfect price-
reversibility (Mork, 1989); Hogan, 1993; Gately, 1993). A pooled model for the OECD oil 
demand rejected the use of a symmetric model over the period 1966-1990 (Hogan, 1993). 
Hogan notes that during the sharp drop in prices in 1986, one could expect a much larger 
demand increase than experienced. We expect a similar result following the 2008 price fall. 
Gately and Huntington (2002) illustrate the expected results for demand response for both 
symmetric and asymmetric reactions. Using real price of oil versus oil demand per capita over 
the period 2004-2012, diagrams in Figure 4 resemble the stylised functions in Gately and 
Huntington (2002) and show evidence to proceed with asymmetric decomposition. 
Decomposition of price into three monotonic series follows a method used in 
agricultural commodity analysis in Gately (1993) noting that prior to this approach, structural 
breaks were used which have less explanatory power. The use of asymmetric price effects 
also controls for instances of technological improvement and acts as a proxy for energy 
saving technological change (van Benthem and Romani, 2009). Therefore, we use a similar 
decomposition as in Gately (1993). We expect to find greater response to prices rises than to 
price decreases. Gately and Huntington (2002) undertake a decomposition of income to 
consider asymmetry to income changes. This is of interest in this paper due to the occurrence 
of the global financial crisis during the period of study. 
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Figure 4: Price response functions (oil price versus demand). 
Source: Author panel data 
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In order to estimate asymmetries a decomposition of the price and income is 
undertaken. In order to present the concept of variable decomposition the term X will be used. 
In our study X can represent either price (P) or income (Y). This technique can be applied to 
any time series independent variable. 
We decompose in logarithmic form: the cumulative sum of increases in the maximum 
value, the cumulative sum of decreases (cuts) in the variable and the cumulative sum of sub-
maximum increases (recoveries) in the variable. In order to establish the decomposition, the 
annual change in the variable is calculated. The base year is a given and is indicated as X1 
which in this study is 1980.  
 
The variables in the decomposition are defined as:  
 
Xmax, t  = cumulative series maximum rises in the logarithmic value of the variable; 
monotonically increasing: ΔXmax,t ≥ 0  
 
Xcut, t  = cumulative falls in the logarithmic value of the variable; monotonically 
decreasing: ΔXcut,t ≤ 0  
 
Xrec, t  = cumulative sub maximum rises in the logarithmic value of the variable; 
monotonically increasing: ΔXrec,t ≥ 0  
 
Therefore, a variable e.g. P or Y, can be presented in the form: 
 
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡  +  𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 (5) 
   
Illustration of the decomposition clearly indicates the effect it has on the series. Over the time 
period of study (1980-2012), the decomposition of price is depicted in Figure 5. Equally, 
income decomposition can be illustrated as in Figure 6 for the UK. 
 
Therefore, equation (4) can be now expressed to account for asymmetric prices and income. 
The base asymmetric specification is presented as:  
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(6) 
The model will account for period of declines in price and income, which may not 
produce significant changes because of the nature of technological development (Hogan, 
1993). Elasticities for Model (6) will be estimated using the parameter on 𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡, 
as in Gately and Huntington (2002).  
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Figure 5: Decomposition of oil price in the period 1980-2012 
 
 
Figure 6: Decomposition of UK income in the period 1980-2012 
 
4.4 Estimation Technique 
 
Following Gately and Huntington (2002) we analyse multiple specifications of the 
model to compare the elasticities obtained. In order to establish difference between developed 
and developing nations a separate panel will be estimated for each group of countries. The 
definition of developing and developed countries for the purpose of this paper is as defined in 
Appendix 1, the decision for classification is based upon the average GDP per capita in that 
country over the period of the study. The use of two separate panels not only improves the 
efficiency of estimation over separate time series regressions, but also helps to correct mis-
specification caused by cross-sectional heterogeneity (Fawcett and Price, 2012).  
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 We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to estimate our models. Hamilton 
(2003) suggests that OLS provides high quality estimation for oil demand models. In addition, 
cross-country fixed effects will be used. This estimates a different intercept variable 
(constant) for each country and is used to regulate static differences in countries (van 
Benthem and Romani, 2009). The intercept in a fixed effects model (FEM) is assumed to be 
time invariant, and consequently the slope coefficients do not change over time (Gujarati, 
2003). One may consider each country to have a heterogeneous starting demand. This would 
theoretically fit with the FEM. The suitability of this approach is tested using the Redundant 
Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio. 
Initially, symmetric static models will be estimated and then a dynamic element will 
be introduced through the introduction of a lagged term. If this is statistically significant it 
will provide further insight into the responsiveness of oil demand. The use of asymmetric 
decomposition for both price and income will be considered. The suitability of the approach 
will be tested using a Wald test. The preferred model for each panel will be established after 
consideration of the economic merit and statistical significance.  
 A dynamic panel model with fixed effects can cause bias in the results (Webb, 2006). 
Individual (country) FE is suggested to give unreliable estimates as the number FE estimators 
tend to infinity when time period is fixed (Nickell, 1981). The FE yields significant 
importance in this analysis as it controls for bias, which could occur from omitted variables 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Even through the separation of country groups there still exists 
heterogeneity between the country groups. Estimations without FE produce elasticities that 
are unrealistically large. However, when the panel is sufficiently large in time dimension, e.g. 
when T=30, average bias is reduced drastically, although the model is not the most efficient 
estimation (Judson and Owen, 1999). Consequently, FE is suggested to be the most suitable 
approach for estimation.  
 An alternative panel data estimation, a first-differenced generalised moment model 
(GMM) instead of using OLS, could increase model efficiency (Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the GMM method for dealing with bias in dynamic panel 
data models. This has been applied to a study of OECD energy demand, but found similar 
elasticities to previous studies (Lui, 2004). Therefore, despite the potential for bias the 
country FE approach used in this model has been suitable and explains the prevalence of 
previous studies following this estimation technique.  
 
4.5 Data 
 
The data set employed consists of 562 observations for 16 countries over the period 
1980-2012. The countries in the data set account for over 65 percent of oil demand in 2012; 
32 percent of the consumption is from just the USA and China. Less developed countries 
(LDCs) in 1980 only accounted for 7.9 percent, but in 2012 made up 21.9 percent of global 
demand. Figure 7 shows a positive relationship between growth in income and growth in oil 
demand. A notable deviation from the linear trend is India. Based upon the growth in energy 
consumption in India, a higher level of GDP growth would be expected and signals energy 
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inefficiency has potentially occurred in these countries. Nonetheless, we expect to find a 
positive relationship between income and oil demand. Table 4 shows an overview of the data 
used in this study.  
 
 
Figure 7: Average growth in GDP per capita and oil consumption (1980-2012).  
Source: Authors’ panel data 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of data 
Country 
Oil Demand per Capita (mbd) GDP per Capita (2012 USD) 
1980 2012 Av. Growth 1980 2012 Av. Growth 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
France 
Germany 
India 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Turkey 
UK 
USA 
1,163 
1,898 
1,690 
3,020 
3,020 
644 
1,930 
4,905 
476 
1,048 
780 
199 
1,044 
295 
1,647 
17,062 
2,805 
2,412 
10,221 
2,358 
2,358 
3,652 
1,345 
4,714 
2,458 
2,074 
933 
247 
1,278 
685 
1,468 
18,555 
1.10% 
-0.56% 
4.61% 
-1.44% 
-0.94% 
3.59% 
-1.50% 
-0.46% 
4.22% 
0.34% 
-0.02% 
-0.11% 
0.08% 
0.84% 
-0.73% 
-0.85% 
1,931 
10,934 
193 
12,500 
11,746 
271 
8,148 
9,308 
1,674 
2,763 
12,775 
15,595 
6,037 
1,567 
9,623 
12,598 
11,340 
52,219 
6,091 
39,772 
41,863 
1,489 
33,072 
46,720 
22,590 
9,749 
45,955 
99,558 
28,624 
10,666 
39,093 
51,749 
7.04% 
5.23% 
11.76% 
4.25% 
4.72% 
5.82% 
5.12% 
5.74% 
9.32% 
5.53% 
4.67% 
6.34% 
5.76% 
7.44% 
4.93% 
4.54% 
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Results 
5.1.1 Symmetric Models 
We first use a simple model to estimate the basic relationship in each country group is 
estimated (equation 2). Table 5 reports the first set of results. In the static model, developing 
countries have larger income and price elasticities of demand, 0.40 and -0.14 respectively. In 
developed countries, income elasticity is 0.01 (statistically insignificant) and price elasticity is 
-0.04. A clear difference in elasticities for the two panels is evident. The estimation suggests 
developing countries are more responsive to oil price rises. This is contrary to the literature. 
Yet, the model does estimate income growth to be fuelling oil demand, consistent with a 
priori expectations.  
The addition of the lag term (equation 4) alters the elasticity results obtained. The 
long-term income elasticity falls to 0.49 in developing economies and rises to 0.11 in 
developed economies. Interestingly the dynamic model results do not differ greatly from the 
static model in developed countries, this could be due to the already mature energy profile 
unlike developing economies that are on a steep growth trajectory. The use of the lagged term 
has significant advantage for econometric analysis by accounting for long-term elasticities, 
and hence will be utilised in future regressions. 
 
Table 5: Results for Models (2) and (4) 
Variable Developing Developed 
Equation 2 4 2 4 
Constant 
Y 
P 
D(t-1) 
-3.564 (-
24.933)** 
0.404 (23.083)** 
-0.140 (-5.729)** 
- 
-0.2686 (-
3.064)** 
0.0414 (4.074)** 
-0.030 (-3.617)** 
0.9157 
(43.216)** 
-0.6512 
(6.217)** 
0.0146 (1.456) 
-0.0384 (-
3.84)** 
- 
0.0757 (1.7890)* 
0.0123 (3.041)** 
-0.0357 (-
8.824)** 
0.8910 
(39.908)** 
FEM 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
198 
6 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
330 
10 
Yes 
320 
10 
R
2 
R
2 
(adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Durbin Watson 
AR(2) 
Redundant FE  
Hausman RE 
0.9727 
0.9717 
967.221** 
6.178* 
0.2455** 
- 
166.178** 
0.000 
0.9976 
0.9975 
9434.766** 
8.824** 
- 
1.243 
5.861** 
11.426** 
0.9072 
0.9040 
282.695** 
25.559** 
0.4878** 
- 
319.300** 
0.000 
0.9865 
0.9859 
1865.563** 
515.418** 
- 
1.872 
3.241** 
23.876** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.404 
-0.140 
0.4911 
-0.3559 
0.0146 
-0.0384 
0.1128 
-0.3275 
i) t-statistics are in parenthesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
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The main consideration from the symmetric models is to establish the correct panel 
data estimation technique. The Hausman test is found to be inconclusive in equation (2) for 
both country groups, and the use of random effects is strongly rejected in the dynamic model. 
The use of fixed effects is strongly supported by the Redundant Fixed Effects Likelihood ratio 
for both equations (2) and (4). Accordingly, in all future estimations fixed effects will be 
applied as it fits statistically and theoretically with the approach undertaken. 
5.1.2 Asymmetric Models 
Theoretical and empirical support for the application of asymmetric response 
functions is established earlier. Econometric analysis using decomposition of the income and 
price series (equation 6) yields more noteworthy results that can be applied to the recent price 
shock. Table 6 provides the estimation and diagnostic tests.  
The initial estimation combines both income and price decompositions in one model. 
In both panels the Wald test finds that the use of decomposition is not redundant. The Pmax 
term is the largest elasticity for both country groups. The difference in long-run price 
elasticities is less than 0.03, with both groups adjusting demand similarly. The elasticities for 
Pcut illustrate energy maturity in developed countries, with elasticity of -0.03 compared to -
0.05 in developing countries. Hence if price fell by $10/barrel, in the short-run, developing 
countries will ceteris paribus, demand an additional 1.04mbd in excess of developed 
economies.  
 
Table 6: Results for Model (6) 
i) t-statistics are in parenthesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
 
 
Variable Developing Developed 
Constant 
Ymax 
Ycut 
Yrec 
Pmax 
Pcut 
Prec 
D(t-1) 
-0.1829 (-5.008)** 
0.0591 (3.338)** 
0.1642 (5.685)** 
0.0308 (1.049) 
-0.0473 (-1.468)* 
-0.053 (-4.474)** 
-0.017 (-1.363) 
0.8641 (36.373)** 
0.0480 (2.738)** 
0.0270 (2.056)* 
0.0852 (2.668)** 
0.0799 (2.088)* 
-0.0573 (-2.945)** 
-0.0281 (-3.649)** 
-0.0313 (-4.973)** 
0.8731 (35.307)** 
Country Fixed Effect (FE) 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
320 
10 
R
2 
R
2 
(adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Redundant FE Likelihood 
AR(2) 
Wald Test 
0.9980 
0.9978 
7455.124** 
4.769* 
7.479** 
0.9111 
24.606** 
0.9868 
0.9861 
1419.998** 
677.616** 
3.722** 
1.892 
27.776** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.4349 
-0.3481 
0.2128 
-0.3885 
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For developing countries, the largest income elasticity is when income falls (Ycut) with 
an elasticity of 0.16, indicating that falls in income have the strongest effect on oil demand. 
Over the time period most income rises in developing countries are increases in the maximum 
value (i.e. Ymax). Long-run income elasticity based on this variable is 0.43. Contrasting to 
developed economies, increases in the maximum income are not as strong and shows maturity 
in the energy cycle. This yields a long-run elasticity of 0.21. Thus, the developing countries 
demand for oil is fuelled significantly by income growth.  
The models do not pass autocorrelation tests indicating that the variables are 
correlated over time. This could be due to misspecification by the use of two decomposed 
time-series. In fact, van Bentham and Romani (2009) have issues with autocorrelation and re-
specification helped reduce the effect.  
5.1.3 Adjustments to the decomposed model  
As previously highlighted the models suffer from autocorrelation. Accordingly, two 
variations on equation (6) will be presented, each with one decomposed series (price or 
income). Re-specification can be used to correct for autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003). This is 
because inference may occur between the two decomposed series if included in one model. 
 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼2𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (6p) 
 
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 𝛼1𝑌𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼2𝑃𝑡 + +𝛾𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6y) 
 
Estimation of the improved equations is presented in Table 7. The models do still 
suffer from autocorrelation in developing countries and non-normality in developed 
economies. However, the significance is lower and therefore Models (6p) and (6y) are better 
specified to highlight differences between the elasticities in the two panels. The non-
normality in developed economies can be attributed to outliers for the UK in 1984 and 1985 
which significantly deviates from the fitted line (see Figure 8). This might have been in part 
due to the miners’ strike which caused greater dependency on oil (Ledger and Sallis, 1995). 
This could be controlled using a dummy variable, but the inference on the estimated 
parameters is low. 
The partial use of asymmetry in equations (6y) and (6p) yield elasticities that indicate 
the substantial disparity between the two country groups for income elasticity. In equation 
(6y) income elasticity is 0.67 in developing and 0.18 in developed economies. The 
decomposition indicates short-run income elasticity to be nearly four times larger in 
developing countries when there is an increase in the series-maxima. The effect of a price 
shock that increases the series-maxima (Pmax) is insignificant in developing countries, thus 
indicating the price shock had little statistical importance on consumption.  
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Table 7: Results for Models (6y) and (6p) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i) t-statistics are in parenthesis 
ii) Elasticities 𝜖𝑌 and 𝜖𝑃 are long-term elasticities and are comparable  
**1% significance level; *5% significance 
 
 
Figure 8: Residual plot for Model (6y), developing countries. 
 
 
Variable Developing Developed 
Model 6y 6p 6y 6p 
Constant 
Y 
Ymax 
Ycut 
Yrec 
P 
Pmax 
Pcut 
Prec 
D(t-1) 
-0.011 (-0.364) 
 
0.081 (6.217)** 
0.141 (5.242)** 
0.052 (1.873)* 
-0.037 (-4.680)** 
 
 
 
0.878 (38.513)** 
-0.669(-5.295)** 
0.081 (5.212)** 
 
 
 
 
-0.045 (-1.354) 
-0.016 (-1.595) 
-0.047 (-4.203)** 
0.912 (43.694)** 
0.195 (8.803)** 
 
0.021 (3.406)** 
0.093 (3.029)** 
0.079 (2.185)* 
-0.034 (-8.217)** 
 
 
 
0.886 (39.689)** 
-0.262 (-2.427)* 
0.033 (2.748)** 
 
 
 
 
-0.065 (-3.456)** 
-0.023 (-3.485)** 
-0.033 (-5.889)** 
0.867 (35.382)** 
Country FE 
Observations 
Countries 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
192 
6 
Yes 
320 
10 
Yes 
320 
10 
R
2 
R
2 
(adjusted) 
F-statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
Redundant FE 
AR(2) 
Wald Test 
0.9980 
0.9978 
8811.827** 
3.7503 
6.5278** 
1.301 
4.960** 
0.9977 
0.9976 
7928.852** 
5.703* 
7.551** 
1.432 
2.234 
0.9868 
0.9862 
1625.781** 
674.921** 
3.5999** 
1.835 
8.974** 
0.9867 
0.9861 
1616.211** 
595.079** 
3.9013** 
1.972* 
48.066** 
𝜖𝑌 
𝜖𝑃 
0.6680 
-0.3032 
0.9205 
-0.5114 
0.1842 
-0.2982 
0.2481 
-0.4887 
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Across all regressions the income elasticity is discovered to be approximately 0.2 in 
developed economies and between 0.5-0.7 in developing economies. Demand has tended to 
adjust more to increases, rather than decreases in price, except in one instance for developing 
economies. The price elasticity is generally stronger in developed countries, which indicates 
more responsiveness to price changes. There are clear differences between the country groups 
and the driving factors behind their demand for oil across the time period. The heterogeneity 
between the two panels has implications on policy and in understanding the recent price 
shock. 
The preferred models to be used for further analysis are Model (6y) for developing 
countries and Model (6p) for developed countries. In developing countries, consistent with a 
priori expectations the key driver for oil consumption has been income. Model (6y) suitably 
captures this and allows consideration of the income effect. In developed countries, the more 
stable growth has had less effect on oil consumption, thus price plays a greater role on 
consumption patterns. Consequently, Model (6p) will be used. The crucial elasticities are 
indicated in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Crucial elasticities 
Panel Income Elasticity Price Elasticity 
Developing 
Developed 
0.6680 
0.2481 
-0.3032 
-0.4887 
 
 
5.2 Income and Substitution Effect 
 
Income elasticity is significantly closer to unity in comparison to developed 
economies. This indicates a dependency on oil for economic development. Yet, one must 
consider if oil is a key driver in development, why does developing countries consumption 
suffer significantly less in the event of an oil price shock? One might consider this in the 
context of energy intensity and the structure of industry in the countries.  
Analysis of the decomposed price Model (6p) shows an insignificant parameter for 
Pmax. This indicates that developing countries may have been unaffected by the price shock; 
as the Pmax term is only activated in this model during the period of price shock. Additionally, 
considering the model with both series decomposed (6) in the lead up to the price shock (Prec) 
short-term demand adjustment is only 1.7 percent. This is nearly half of the developed 
economies response.  
The strength of the income effect in developing countries indicates that they are less 
affected by the price of oil. Calculation of the Slutsky equation for each panel provides 
indication of the compensated demand for oil, and thus indicates the relative income and 
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substitution effects.
2
 The results in Table 9 indicate the income effect is 6.3 times stronger in 
developing countries showing income growth is fuelling oil demand. Additionally, the 
substitution effect is 2.08 larger in developed countries and indicated a larger responsiveness 
to the price shock.  
 
Table 9: Income and substitution effects (derived from crucial elasticities) 
Country Group Oil Spending   
(% Income) 
Income Effect Sub. Effect 
Developing 
Developed 
11.09 
4.77 
0.074 
0.011 
-0.2291 
-0.4778 
 
 
5.3 Explanations for Variation in Consumption Patterns 
 Income in developing countries has increased on average by seven per cent in the time 
period studied. The compound effect of this is a doubling of national income, this major 
change in economic activity is sure to cause changes in consumption patterns and provides an 
explanation to the strength of the income effect in developing countries. Nonetheless, the 
current per capita oil consumption is still very low and any growth in disposable income will 
increase oil demand further.  
 Behr (2009) regards the increases in oil demand to have had a disproportionate effect 
on global oil prices. One of the main components fuelling the surge was the increased demand 
for transport fuel and in particular diesel for the Asian market (Yergin, 2008). As noted in 
Section 3, annual car sales in China alone now exceed 20 million vehicles. To sustain this oil 
demand will have to increase by 128 million barrels a year (Petrie, 2011). Projecting oil 
demand to 2035, the key driver of oil demand will be transport fuels and this is expected to 
account for 40 percent of the overall demand increase (IEA, 2012). They expect road freight 
in non-OECD countries to grow nine-times in part due to increased construction and 
industrial activity. 
Growing economies also require large amounts of infrastructure creation, which is 
very energy intensive. Such projects are inextricably linked with income growth and this is a 
good indication as to why the income effect is so large in developing countries. Barclays 
(2012) report that most developing economies are in a stage of rapid development and 
creation of infrastructure, with demand outstripping supply on these projects. The 
construction of motorways in these countries will only make car ownership more appealing so 
increasing fuel demand.  
 One could consider that during a period of rapid economic growth in developing 
countries little regard was paid to energy efficient technologies. The dataset used in this paper 
                                                 
2
 The Slutsky equation allows derivation of the income and substitution effects based upon the 
elasticities obtained and the equation in elasticity form can be expressed as: 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖𝜂𝑖 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑖 denotes price elasticity of demand for oil (i.e. 𝛼2), the share of oil expenditure as percentage 
GDP (calculated from panel), 𝜂𝑖  is the income elasticity of demand (𝛼1), 𝜎𝑖𝑖  denotes substitution 
effect, and income effect is 𝑠𝑖𝜂𝑖. 
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shows that developing countries use 3.6 times more oil per unit of GDP than developed 
economies. Inefficient use of energy in developing countries caused levels of consumption 
that could otherwise have kept global prices down (Merrill Lynch, 2012). However, energy 
intensity has been declining in all regions globally. In part this is attributed to China 
becoming less energy-intensive recently (BP, 2013).  
Asian developing countries often have price controls which prevent the transmission 
of rises in crude prices in order for the country to continue on an uninterrupted growth 
trajectory. Price controls reduce the substitution effect as there is less incentive to be more 
energy efficient in the face of price increases (Economist, 2008). The monetary size of fuel 
subsidies is large. In 2013, India spent $23bn in reducing fuel costs (Mallett, 2014). If pump 
costs were reflective of the global price of oil consumers may have reduced oil demand and 
the price shock could have been dampened. However, as this paper uses a single price we will 
are unable to further analyse these effects. 
In contrast, developed countries already have a mature energy profile. Oil is primarily 
used as a transportation fuel, with electricity production now undertaken using other fossil 
fuels or alternative forms of energy (Merrill Lynch, 2012). The consumer faces the brunt of 
oil price shocks in economies where transportation fuel is the primary use of oil, as crude 
prices are easily transferred to the pumps. This is the case in most OECD countries, with 
minimal fuel subsidies in place (Economist, 2008). Therefore, the substitution effect is likely 
to be greater. Indeed, the USA witnessed a slowdown in automobile purchases in 2008 in 
light of higher oil prices (Hamilton, 2009).  
 The difference in consumption patterns between the two panels is noteworthy due to 
three factors. Firstly, growth has caused a structural change to the developing economies. The 
move to greater personal transportation shows no sign of slowing and consumers are unlikely 
to reverse their lifestyle because of fuel price increase. Therefore the income effect is greater 
in developing countries as the middle classes seek higher standard of living. In contrast, 
developed countries have mature energy profiles and have little rationale to rapidly increase 
long-term transport fuel demand. Once a consumer has a car, there is a finite amount of 
driving one can do, whereas developing countries are starting to use personal cars and 
consumption changes will be substantial. Secondly, the rapid expansion may have neglected 
energy saving. If alternative energy forms were in place there would be a greater substitution 
effect from a shock in developing countries. Finally, oil subsidies prevent the transmission of 
global prices hence fuelling consumption and biasing the substitution effect downwards in the 
developing economies. 
 
5.4 Policy Implications 
 
 Preventing spikes in oil prices is difficult to achieve due to the complex nature of the 
market as highlighted in this paper. Nonetheless, economic policy could be used in order to 
smooth prices based upon the work of Behr (2009) and Wurzel et al. (2009). This paper has a 
number of policy recommendations.  
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5.4.1 Reducing Oil Intensity 
 Oil intensity has already reduced significantly in China and other developing countries 
(see Figure 9). The indicator provides a measure of consumption per unit of output in the 
economy. Reducing oil intensity acts as a safeguard if oil prices do increase, as spare capacity 
exists within the economy (Wurzel et al., 2009). They note in the event of a demand shock as 
witnessed in the last oil price shock lower energy intensity would have reduced the impact of 
rising incomes. The need to lower intensity is also a recommendation reported by Gately and 
Huntington (2002). This paper has found a strong link between economic development and 
increased oil consumption. Unless intensity reduces, the potential for future demand shocks 
will still exist.  
 
 
Figure 9: Global oil intensity  
Source: BP (2013) 
 
5.4.2 Recognising Regional Differences 
 This paper has clearly highlighted a difference in consumption patterns between the 
two panels. Clearly demand functions differ based on the level of development in an 
economy, therefore policy cannot be globally homogenous. Additionally, each panel has 
different responses when asymmetric decomposition is applied. If this is not taken into 
account the elasticities could be biased and thus incorrect policy decisions would be made. 
Each country has an individual energy mix, with varied uses of oil. OECD countries use 80 
percent of their oil consumption for transportation. This value is around 15 percent lower in 
developing economies (Merrill Lynch, 2012). Consequently, blanket reduction policy cannot 
be applied. Therefore international economic organisations such as the IEA should target 
policy to enable policy address regional specific issues. The use of meaningful heterogeneous 
policy which reduces oil intensity will help to buffer future oil price shocks.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated price and income elasticities in a period of global oil price 
volatility. Following discussion which captured the development of the literature, it was 
established that a scarcity of research has been undertaken in light of the recent price shock. 
Previous studies had introduced the use of asymmetric decomposition and cross country panel 
analysis, but until this study such techniques had not been applied to a dataset that covered the 
recent price volatility. Analysis of late has concentrated on a time-series approach and this has 
failed to capture the efficiency gains obtained from panel data.  
Currently in Epoch III oil pricing, the previously established global trade flows appear 
to be changing. Fundamental economic analysis established the price rises following the 
millennium to have occurred as a result of disequilibrium. Supply hiatus from non-OPEC 
producers coupled with a number of geopolitical events resulted in supply growth stalling. 
The recent price shock was characterised not by a significant supply shock as in previous 
episodes, but rather a failure to escalate production to satisfy market demands. It was 
discovered that unexpected levels of demand was the primary contributing factor in causing 
the disequilibrium.  
A dynamic cross country fixed effects specification was used in order to capture the 
heterogeneous intercept level of demand in each country. As the period of study was greater 
than thirty-years the potential for parameter bias resulting from FE was substantially reduced. 
Estimation of the models including asymmetric decomposition for both income and price 
yielded two noteworthy consumption patterns. Firstly, the effect of income falls is larger than 
income rises, with income elasticities being stronger for developing countries in all 
specifications. Secondly, when oil price rises the elasticity is larger in contrast to price falls, 
but this effect is only significant in developed countries.  
Subsequent analysis of these observations through the use of Slutsky decomposition 
emphasised the results obtained in the regression. Developing countries have an income effect 
which is 6.3 times larger than in developed countries. Thus, in a period of significant 
economic growth for developing countries it is evident as to why oil consumption increased 
so dramatically. Moreover, the substitution effect in developed economies was 2.1 stronger 
than in developing countries. This explains the more responsive adjustment of consumption of 
developed countries in reaction to the price shock of 2007/08.  
The results obtained are explainable in relation to the difference in economic structure 
between the two panels. Developing countries are assumed to have not yet reached relative 
energy maturity in relation to fossil fuels. Consumers are increasingly using oil as a 
transportation fuel as new found disposable income is being expended on car ownership. This 
explains the relative strength of the income effect in developing countries. The paper also 
recognises economic development has been at the expense of lower energy efficiency, again 
reinforcing the size of the income effect in developing countries.  
Reflection of the analysis indicated a number of policy implications for the oil market. 
This paper recommended the implementation of oil-intensity reduction policy in order to 
maximise efficiency. Such policy would enable a buffering if oil prices rise as a result of a 
demand shock. A crucial policy consideration postulated is the recognition of heterogeneous 
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consumption patterns between country groups and that a one size fits all policy should not be 
undertaken.  
There is potential for future research. This paper considered two independent panels 
separated by the level of economic development. However, by increasing the dataset and 
incorporation of more countries, alternative panels could be estimated. These could include 
oil importers, oil exporters and geographical regions. Granulation of the current approach 
would allow more tailored policy development and a more comprehensive understanding of 
income and price responses which would aid economic forecasting. Furthermore, research 
could be considered into the effect of subsidies on consumption by utilising country price 
data.  
This paper has contributed to the existing literature and has studied oil consumption 
patterns during Epoch III pricing. The dominance of the income effect in developing countries 
has been staggering. In conclusion, oil consumption patterns during the period 1980-2012 
varied significantly between developing and developed countries and failure to account for 
this will bias the effectiveness of energy policies.  
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Appendix 1: Country Groups 
 
Tables 10 and 11 outline the classification of developed and developing country applied in 
this study. The study has separated the countries based on their GDP per capita into these 
country groups. The difficulty in obtaining data for low income (developing country) reduces 
the number of available countries of analysis.  
 
Table 10: Developing country group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Developed country group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country GDP Growth Rate Demand Growth 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Korea 
Mexico 
Turkey 
7.04% 
11.76% 
5.82% 
9.32% 
5.53% 
7.44% 
1.10% 
4.61% 
3.59% 
4.22% 
0.34% 
0.84% 
Average 7.82% 2.45% 
Country GDP Growth Rate Demand Growth 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
UK 
USA 
5.23% 
4.25% 
4.72% 
5.12% 
5.74% 
4.67% 
6.34% 
5.76% 
4.93% 
4.54% 
-0.56% 
-1.44% 
-0.94% 
-1.50% 
-0.46% 
-0.02% 
-0.11% 
0.08% 
-0.73% 
-0.85% 
Average 5.13% -0.65% 
